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defaults imposed large losses on the heavily exposed 
banks, ultimately triggering banking crises.
Against this background, it is surprising that the large 
literature looking at how different types of crises occur 
and combine (the so-called “twin crises” literature) has 
only recently begun to examine the links between fiscal 
and financial distress. Concerning emerging markets, 
two notable exceptions are Panizza and Borenzstein 
(2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). However, these 
papers are mainly concerned with establishing whether 
it is banking crises that predict sovereign ones, or vice-
versa; while they do provide a discussion of the main 
channels of transmission between the two crises, these 
channels are not studied formally. Similarly, the growing 
literature that studies feedback loops between 
sovereign and financial risks in the euro area models 
the common dynamics of banks’ and sovereigns’ 
Credit Default Swaps (see e.g. Acharya et al, 2014), but 
does not analyze the drivers of this relationship. 
Our paper fills this gap by considering a large set of 
macro-financial variables through which fiscal or 
financial stress may be transmitted. New to the 
literature, we not only differentiate between “single” 
and “twin” crises, but we also distinguish those twin 
events that are initially triggered by banking crises from 
those initially triggered by debt crises. We use an event 
analysis methodology to study the behavior of each 
variable of interest around each type of crisis.
Our contribution is two-fold. First, we find systematic 
differences between “single” crises and “twin” ones. We 
find that a number of empirical facts usually associated 
with either “banking” or “debt” crises in general are 
actually associated with “twin” events only. Second, we 
show that considering the sequence of crises within 
“twin” events is important for understanding their 
transmission channels and economic consequences. 
FEATURES
 
BANKING CRISES AND SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS IN EMERGING 
MARKETS: EXPLORING THE LINKS
I. BALTEANU AND A. ERCE 
WORKING PAPER Nº 1414
This paper provides a set of stylized facts on the 
mechanisms through which banking and sovereign 
distress feed into each other. Using an event analysis 
methodology and a large sample of emerging market 
economies over three decades, we study the behavior 
around crises of variables describing the balance sheet 
interconnection between the banking and public 
sectors, the characteristics of the banking sector, the 
state of public finances, and the macroeconomic 
context. We find that there are systematic differences 
between “single” and “twin” crises across all these 
dimensions. Additionally, we find that the sequencing of 
events in “twin” episodes is important for understanding 
their drivers, transmission channels and economic 
consequences.
1  Introduction
The two-way interaction between fiscal and financial 
instability has been at the core of the recent turmoil in 
Europe. In some countries, systemic banking crises 
triggered fiscal distress due to the magnitude of bank 
rescue operations (for example, in Iceland and Ireland). 
In others, substantial sovereign debt tensions, leading 
to successive sovereign downgrades (and even to debt 
restructuring in Greece), severely weakened domestic 
financial systems. 
In contrast to Europe, the combination of extreme 
fiscal and financial distress is nothing new to emerging 
markets. Ecuador (in the mid-1990s) and Dominican 
Republic (in early 2000s) accumulated so much debt 
trying to sort out a sequence of banking crises that 
were forced to restructure their sovereign debt 
obligations. In turn, during the Argentinean (2001) and 
Russian (1998) crises, governments relied on domestic 
banks as a source of financing. The eventual sovereign 
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over the event window, relative to “tranquil times”. The 
fact that the “tranquil times” baseline is common to all 
events makes the comparison among coefficients 
straightforward. 
3  Banking crises and sovereign defaults: exploring the 
links 
Figures 1-18 plot the estimated coefficients throughout 
the seven-year crisis window for a selection of the 
variables included in the working paper. We are 
interested in what differentiates “single” banking crises 
from those that bring down the sovereign and, similarly, 
what differentiates “single” sovereign defaults from 
those that eventually lead to banking crises. 
3.1 Banking crises versus twin bank-debt crises
Regarding the difference between banking crises (B) 
and twin bank-debt crises (BD), the interplay between 
banks’ and both central banks’ and governments’ 
balance sheets reveals systematic differences around 
the two types of episodes (figures 1 and 2). Ahead of 
single events, low exposures to government combine 
with high liquidity support from the monetary authority, 
while in the aftermath, liquidity support drops 
substantially and banks’ holdings of public debt start 
2 Definitions, data and methodology 
The study covers 78 emerging market countries and 
covers three decades, from 1975 to 2007. Sovereign 
crises are defined following Standard and Poor’s, while 
banking crises are the “systemic events” catalogued in 
Laeven and Valencia (2013). “Twin crises” are pairs of 
sovereign and banking crises that take place at intervals 
of less than three years one from the other.  We thus 
isolate four types of events: (i) “single” banking crises; 
(ii) “single” sovereign debt crises; (iii) “twin bank-debt” 
crises, where a banking crisis is followed by a sovereign 
one during the following three years; and (iv) “twin 
debt-bank” crises, where a sovereign crisis is followed 
by a banking one during the following three years. 
Under these definitions, there are 140 distinct crises in 
the sample, of which 51 are single banking crises, 61 
single debt crises, 15 twin bank-debt crises and 13 
twin debt-bank crises.
The choice of variables used in the econometric analysis 
is guided by the literature on the main channels through 
which financial tensions may lead to sovereign stress, 
and vice-versa. These channels include direct balance 
sheet effects (through liquidity injections, public rescue 
operations, materialization of explicit guarantees or 
contingent liabilities and banks’ holdings of public debt), 
as well as other indirect ways through which these crises, 
and policies deployed to address them, impact the wider 
economy and market sentiment. Accordingly, we 
consider four categories of variables, describing the 
bank-public balance sheet interconnections (namely: 
banks’ holdings of public debt and credit from the 
central bank to the banking sector); banking sector 
characteristics (assets, credit to the private sector, and 
deposits); the state of public finances (budget balance, 
public revenues and expenses, and public debt); and 
other macroeconomic factors (real growth, inflation 
rate, foreign portfolio capital inflows, and the 
composition of external debt). 
Following Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011) and Broner 
et al (2013), we use an event analysis methodology, 
which allows us to estimate how the conditional 
expectation of each variable depends on the temporal 
distance from each type of crises, given the proximity 
of other crises, and relative to a “tranquil times” (i.e. 
non-crisis) baseline. We estimate a specification in 
which each variable of interest is regressed on a set of 
dummy variables, which take the value of 1 when a 
country is within three years before or after a crisis of 
each type. The regression allows for country fixed 
effects and, in some specifications, country-specific 
trends. The estimated coefficients measure the 
conditional effect of each type of crisis on the variable 
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While the two events occur against similar initial debt 
and budget positions, diverging patterns of public 
finances emerge once banking crises are underway, as 
figures 5 and 6 show. Banking crises that are part of 
“twin” events are associated with a sharper increase in 
budget deficit and a larger accumulation of public debt, 
which suggests that they put more strains on 
government finances than “single” banking events. 
Finally, banking crises that are part of “twin” episodes 
have a more damaging and persistent effect on the 
economy (as shown in figures 7 and 8) and are also 
associated with a larger loss in foreign investors’ 
confidence, as reflected in figure 9.
to accumulate. Ahead of BD events, the fast and 
substantial accumulation of government paper on 
banks’ balance sheets combines with slow-growing 
central bank support, while in the aftermath, the 
increase in public claims moderates and liquidity 
support shoots up. These different patterns could be 
due to differences in the size and timing of the initial 
shock to the banking sector, policy choices by the 
central bank and government, structural features of the 
banking sector or, most likely, a combination of all 
these factors. 
Figures 3 and 4 reveal significant differences between 
banking sectors around the two types of events. On 
average, banking systems are significantly larger and 
deeper around banking crises that are part of “twin” 
events, thus potentially needing larger public support 
in situations of stress. They are also likely to have a 
more damaging effect on the economy (and the 
sovereign), giving the government more incentives to 
intervene. In “single” episodes, banks start to size 
down already ahead of the crisis and continue to do so 
as the crisis unfolds. In contrast, in “twin” episodes, 
asset downsizing starts late into the banking crisis and 
the process is more gradual. This might indicate that 
the policy response is to try to keep the banking sector 
afloat, postponing deleveraging until the crisis engulfs 
the public sector as well. 
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sector. Overall, the average banking sector around DB 
events appears to be smaller than the one ahead of 
D events (figures 12 and 13). 
3.2 Sovereign debt crises versus twin debt-bank crises
Regarding the differences between “single” debt (D) 
and “twin debt-bank” (DB) crises, we find that, ahead 
of the latter, the average banking sector is more 
exposed to the government and the pace of increase in 
its public debt holdings is faster (figure 11). The amount 
of liquidity support provided by the central bank is 
significantly large around the two episodes (figure 10), 
suggesting that banking sector tensions accompany 
both events, including “single” ones. Nevertheless, 
while the liquidity support is flat throughout D crises, it 
increases dramatically during DB ones. These 
differences could indicate that “twin” defaults are more 
damaging to banks’ balance sheets and may leave the 
sovereign with less margin to support the banking 
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3.3 Timing matters
Apart from the systematic differences between “single” 
and “twin” crises, our analysis also shows that “twin” 
crises themselves are far from being homogenous 
events. By taking into account the sequencing of crises 
during “twin” episodes, we find significant differences 
in the levels and dynamics of budget deficits, inflation 
rates, credit to the private sector, and portfolio capital 
flows. This is a relevant result, given that the twin-crises 
literature does not typically examine the sequencing of 
twin events.
4 Conclusions
Our results add to the literature aimed at uncovering 
stylized facts associated with financial and economic 
crises. The event study presented in this paper 
distinguishes several different types of crises, and can 
reveal nonlinear relationships. We believe that these 
results, by providing a detailed understanding of the 
economic dynamics around different crisis episodes, 
can help in building better early warning indicators, as 
well as in designing theoretical models where these 
issues can be studied more formally. 
While public finances are roughly similar ahead of 
the two classes of events, public expenditure is cut 
more drastically (and public debt drops faster) in 
the aftermath of “twin” defaults (figures 14 and 15). 
This could point to either a lack of fiscal space, or the 
adoption of a more austere stabilization package, both of 
which may negatively affect the banking sector and the 
economy in the short run. DB defaults have a larger 
immediate negative impact on growth, while the recovery 
in the aftermath is slower (figure 16). These growth 
dynamics are accompanied by inflation rates that fall 
more markedly during “twin” events than during “single” 
ones (figure 17) – which might be a further indication of a 
tight austerity package implemented in the aftermath of 
DB defaults. Finally, around DB events there is little 
foreign capital flowing into the economy (figure 18). 
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THE AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT OF PENSION EXPENDITURES  
IN SPAIN: AN EVALUATION OF THE 2013 PENSION REFORM 
ALFONSO R. SÁNCHEZ 
WORKING PAPER Nº 1420
The Spanish pension system was reformed in 2011, and 
again in 2013, with the goal of ensuring its fiscal balance 
over the long term. This study, undertaken by Alfonso 
Sánchez of the Univ. Pablo de Olavide while he was a 
Visiting Fellow at the Banco de España, quantifies the 
budgetary and distributional impacts of the 2013 reform.
1  The 2013 Spanish pension reform: context and content
Ever since the 1980s, Spanish long-term demographic 
prospects have been  among the weakest in the OECD. 
The authorities have been under constant pressure to 
reform its large pay-as-you-go pension system, but the 
pace of reforms has been sluggish. This state of affairs 
was shattered by the 2008-2012 crisis: acute short-term 
financial imbalances emerged and the government 
responded with a broad set of reforms, implemented in 
two stages in 2011 and 2013. The former was a standard 
package of parametric changes, including a gradual 
increase in the statutory retirement age (from 65 to 67, 
staggered for completion by 2027), in the early retirement 
age (from 61 to 63) and in the qualifying contributive years 
in the pension formula (from 15 to 25 years). The changes 
in 2013 went much further, introducing an automatic 
adjustment mechanism linked to life expectancy and to 
the financial condition of the pension system. The life 
expectancy adjustment is by now relatively standard 
among OECD countries, but the macro-adjustment 
mechanism is an unprecedented innovation. It seeks to 
guarantee the financial stability of the system (over a 
complete business cycle) by adjusting pensions while 
keeping contributions stable.
The new pension formula
Before 2013, pension payments were a function of individual 
characteristics (retirement age, contributive wages and 
years of contributions) and were indexed to consumer 
inflation. The reform introduced three new elements:
(i) “ Factor de sostenibilidad” (sustainability factor). 
Starting in 2019, a new multiplicative term in 
the pension formula will reduce the initial 
pension in lockstep with the observed gains in 
life expectancy at age 67 (using the Social 
Security mortality tables and taking the value 
recorded five years before as a reference).
(ii) “ Indice de Revalorización (IR)” (revaluation index). 
The annual growth rate of the entire pool of 
pensions remaining at the beginning of the 
period, g t+1 , is no longer linked to inflation but 
to (a linearized version of) the following 
formula: 
(1 + gt+1) =
1 + gt+1 It
Gt(1 + gt+1 )(1 + gt+1 )
I
P s
α
(1)
  where is the growth rate of the number of 
pensions, is the growth rate of the average 
pension (the pensions of the deceased are 
generally smaller than those of newcomers),  
is the growth rate of social contributions, 
and I t and G t represent the system’s aggregate 
gross income and expenditure. In an effort to 
smooth the computation over an entire business 
cycle, these growth rates are 11-year moving 
averages. Also for smoothing, only a fraction 
1/4 ≤a≤ 1/3  of  the  annual  imbalance  is 
corrected each year. 
  In equation (1), the first fraction captures the 
dynamics of the system’s financial state (growth 
component), while the second reflects the 
current disequilibrium between revenue and 
expenditures (balance component). Figure 1 
provides a simulation of the workings of the 
mechanism in our base environment (which, as 
described below, assumes an increase in 
pension expenditure G t with roughly constant 
income from contributions I t ). In this setting, 
the balance component, I t  ⁄ G t , leads to a 
negative adjustment in the level of pensions 
(top panel). Similarly, the dynamics of revenue 
and expenses (middle panel) also contribute to 
lower index values (except for a brief interval at 
the beginning). The combined effect, captured 
by g t in the bottom panel, is one of constant 
declines in the real value of pensions. Declines 
peak in the 2035/2055 interval, with annual 
cuts exceeding 4%. Cumulatively, the cuts are 
significant (the real pension benefit 40 years 
after retirement in 2015 could be around 30% 
of its initial value).
(iii)  Bounded IR mechanism: Lower and upper bounds 
on the indexation growth rates were introduced 
to moderate the size of the pension cuts in (ii). 
gt+1 
I
gt+1
P
gt+1 
s
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2 The simulation model and its calibration
We implement a large-scale OLG model in the 
Auerbach-Kotlikoff tradition, applied to the interval 
2010/2100. The basic components of the model and 
the eco/demographic scenarios follow.
Demographics
We use a built-in model to simulate the population 
dynamics in two potential scenarios. Our base setting 
reproduces EUROSTAT’s fertility, mortality and 
immigration assumptions (as used by the EC Aging 
Working Group). Alternatively, we adopt the long-term 
projections of the Spanish National Statistics Institute 
to devise a more up-to-date scenario for fertility and 
mortality, and develop a model of our own for the joint 
performance of immigration and unemployment. This 
latter calibration is our base case, featuring smaller 
immigration flows, higher dependency ratios and lower 
population growth.
Households
Individuals in each generation are grouped in 
representative households that differ in terms of 
education and relative value of leisure (i.e. retirement 
behaviour). They pool their labor income and 
idiosyncratic longevity risk and take coordinated 
retirement and consumption/saving decisions by acting 
as rational expected utility maximizers. Individual 
income flows are generated by exogenous models of 
their life-cycle labor participation and employment, the 
labor earnings of full-time employees and the 
distribution of education. Again we consider base and 
alternative scenarios, although in this case the 
benchmark is less optimistic than the alternative, 
assuming a slow return to moderate unemployment 
rates (16% by 2050), compared with the AWG projection 
(8% by 2035). 
Institutions
We model the retirement and survival pensions in the 
Spanish General Regime, taking the configuration after 
the 2011 reform as our reference. The model includes 
the individual pension formula, affiliation requirements, 
and the system’s discretionary components (minimum 
and maximum pensions and contributions). This 
institutional framework is assumed constant with two 
important qualifications: (i) we make explicit assumptions 
about the future discretionary components and (ii) 
include changes in the very generous system of survival 
pensions. For both (i) and (ii) we propose a basic and an 
alternative scenario. In the base case, minimum and 
maximum pensions stay essentially constant in real 
terms, while maximum contributions capture half of the 
The 2013 law includes explicit values for those 
bounds: a minimum nominal increase in current 
pensions of 0.25% and a maximum real 
increase of 0.5%, show in red and green, 
respectively, in the bottom panel. Assuming 
inflation of 2.5%, the real lower bound on g t+1 
is an annual decrease of 2.25%.
Our aim is to quantitatively assess the financial future 
of the system, with and without the 2013 changes and 
considering a broad range of eco/demographic 
scenarios. We also quantify the welfare costs of the 
2013 reform.
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variation (the percentage shift in the household’s life-
cycle consumption that leaves utility unchanged after 
the reform). Table 1 shows the results. Cohorts of older 
workers suffer large losses, peaking at around 4% for 
those born around 1990 (with some variation by 
educational level). In contrast, cohorts of young workers 
when the reform is implemented and future cohorts are 
better off under the new institutional setting. Educational 
heterogeneity is more important for future generations, 
as college graduates emerge from losses earlier and 
enjoy a steeper profile of gains by age of birth.
growth in labor productivity, and survival pensions are 
progressively eliminated for pensioners having their 
own retirement benefit. In the alternative environments, 
real discretionary components are constant and survival 
regulations are unchanged. The rest of the public sector 
includes rules for public expenditure and public debt as 
a percentage of GDP and for the workings of the 
pension Trust Fund. The overall public budget is 
balanced with a simple linear income tax.
Macroeconomic environments
The supply side of the economy is entirely neoclassical, 
including a Cobb-Douglas production function and 
exogenous technological growth. The model leaves 
aside monetary considerations, but we include inflation 
assumptions to deal with the nominal bounds in the IR 
mechanism. We consider a 2.5% annual inflation rate 
as our base and explore two additional settings with 
larger (4%) and smaller (1%) inflation rates. We also 
consider alternative scenarios for productivity growth 
with an annual 1.6% rate as the base and high/low 
alternatives featuring 2/1% rates.
3 Results
In the base case without the 2013 reform, pension 
expenditure will eventually exceed contributions by 
almost 8% of GDP in  2050/2070 (Base/R11 column of 
Table 2). Tax collection should increase from 22% to 
34% of GDP in 2070 to cope with this extra expenditure. 
The need for additional reform is, therefore, clear. The 
impact of the 2013 changes is shown under the BAA 
headings (“bounded automatic adjustment”) in Table 2. 
The pension expenditure/GDP ratio peaks after the 
reform below 12%, implying “savings” of 5.5 percentage 
points of GDP by 2050. The BAA system seems to work 
well, although the legal bounds imposed on pension 
indexation prevent the system from fully restoring its 
financial equilibrium (a 2% deficit remains in 2050). 
Figure 2 illustrates this outcome: the IR mechanism 
results in pension contraction, but the lower bound is 
reached by around 2030 and stays there for more than 
3 decades. The income coverage of pension benefits 
around 2050 (top panel) is only 91% (compared to a 
96% value in the unbounded simulation). Clearly, the 
operation of the floor in g t  significantly blocks the 
correction of the imbalance. There is also a higher 
(lower) incidence of minimum (maximum) pensions and 
appreciable changes in retirement patterns.
The welfare changes induced by the reform are 
evaluated by calculating an equivalent consumption 
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4 Conclusions
At the aggregate level, the 2013 pension reform implies 
substantial progress towards achieving the long-term 
fiscal balance of the system, largely addressing the 
impact of gradual population aging. This will likely 
stabilize the system, but there is considerable 
uncertainty about the final outcome. Table 2 illustrates 
this uncertainty by showing how the results change in 
the alternative eco-demographic environments. The 
most probable result is that the reform will fall short to 
some extent and some additional adjustments will still 
be necessary. This general conclusion is also contingent 
                                        
Cohort Primary Secondary Adv secondary College
1930 -2.50 -0.29 -0.32 -0.31
1940 -0.87 -0.98 -1.04 -1.08
1950 -1.54 -1.64 -1.76 -1.82
1960 -2.46 -2.48 -2.88 -2.74
1970 -2.73 -3.37 -3.42 -3.19
1980 -3.23 -3.43 -3.22 2.77
1990 -4.10 -3.33 -2.69 -1.37
2000 -2.77 -1.77 -0.97 2.19
2010 -0.96 0.12 1.07 6.33
2020 0.32 1.41 3.50 8.96
WELFARE CHANGES INDUCED BY THE BOUNDED AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT REFORM
 
TABLE 1
NOTE: Welfare changes induced by the BAA reform in the base scenario. Equivalent varations (percentage points) by education level and cohort of birth for 
workers retiring at 65. Negative (positive) sign indicates welfare loss (gain). 
on the future course followed when setting survival 
pensions and minimum/maximum pensions and 
contributions. On welfare grounds, some cohorts suffer 
a disproportional share of the costs. Moreover, the 
mechanism used to rebalance income and expenditures 
relies heavily on reducing pensions in real terms during 
the retirement period (as the Revaluation Index grows 
below the rate of inflation) and less on cutting initial 
pensions through the Sustainability Factor. Therefore 
retirees may face decreasing purchasing power year 
after year during retirement. 
                                        
R11 BAA R11 BAA R11 BAA R11 BAA R11 BAA
2010 -0.91 -1.12 -0.93 -1.11 -0.90 -1.13 -1.67 -1.64 -0.90 -1.11
2030 0.52 -0.71 1.60 -0.04 -1.04 -1.44 0.46 -0.69 1.32 -0.09
2050 7.76 2.21 12.35 4.95 5.21 0.59 8.92 3.20 9.48 4.08
2070 7.92 0.80 11.85 2.91 5.96 -0.29 10.33 2.61 9.79 3.18
Neutral Max/Min 
pensions
Survivors & Old-age 
pension
accumulation
Low
Unemployment
Low
ImmigrationBase
PENSION DEFICIT IN DIFFERENT ECO/DEMOGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENTS
 
TABLE 2 
R11 BAA R11 BAA R11 BAA R11 BAA
2010 -0.66 -0.94 -0.80 -1.00 -0.91 -0.99 -0.91 -1.15
2030 1.32 -0.24 0.25 -0.88 0.52 -0.17 0.52 -0.84
2050 10.39 3.88 6.35 1.31 7.76 3.89 7.76 0.87
2070 10.00 2.52 6.46 -0.15 7.92 2.82 7.92 -0.10
High inflationLow inflationHigh productivity growthLow productivity growth
NOTE: Deficit of the pension system (expenditure minus income) as a percentage of GDP under different simulation scenarios. “R11” indicates pension system
after 2011 reforms. “BAA” indicates pension system under bounded automatic adjustments introduced in 2013.
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STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN A DEBT OVERHANG
JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE AND CARLOS THOMAS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1421
Motivated by current Euro area policy debates, this paper 
analyzes reforms in product and labor markets using a 
macroeconomic model that incorporates credit 
restrictions and a pre-existing stock of long-term debt. 
These two core features of the current scenario facing 
some Euro area countries combine to produce a slow 
deleveraging of the private sector and a persistent 
recession following a negative financial shock. In this 
environment, structural reforms may stimulate output and 
employment even in the short run, despite their 
deflationary effects. Furthermore, by favoring a faster 
recovery of investment and collateral values, product 
market reforms bring forward the end of the recessionary 
deleveraging phase.
1  Structural reforms, deleveraging, and the zero 
lower bound: Uncharted territory
In spite of recent improvements in some countries, 
economic growth in the periphery of the Euro area 
remains fragile, in a context of high private and public 
debt. The lack of room for expansionary fiscal and 
(conventional) monetary policies foreshadows protracted 
private sector deleveraging amid low growth. Against 
this backdrop, structural reforms in product and labor 
markets have recently attracted much support by 
multilateral bodies, central banks and commentators.1
Internal devaluations fostered by reforms leading to 
lower and/or more flexible prices and wages should 
naturally help the external sector lead the recovery in the 
short term, while also stimulating current expenditure of 
forward-looking households and firms (the expectations 
channel). However, as monetary policy is constrained by 
the zero lower bound, the disinflationary effects of 
reforms are also likely to set loose contractionary forces 
in the short term arising from higher real interest rates 
and debt-deflation effects (the deflationary channel). 
Which of the two previous forces dominates – 
competitiveness and long-run expectations versus the 
deflationary channel – remains an open question and, in 
principle, well-intended reforms could end up worsening 
the recession and postponing the recovery, as Eggertsson 
et al. (2014) recently emphasized.2 
2 A macro model of slow deleveraging
To shed light on this issue, this paper examines the 
conditions under which structural market reforms are 
likely to produce positive effects in the short term. To 
this aim, the authors develop a macroeconomic model 
of an open economy within a monetary union in which 
the nominal interest remains fixed, thus emulating the 
zero lower bound constraint. Specifically, the model 
features borrowing constraints that limit the volume of 
loans that debtors can assume relative to the value of 
their real estate holdings. An important novelty with 
respect to most previous work in this area, aimed at 
producing an empirically plausible slow deleveraging 
path, is the assumption of long term debt contracts that 
impose a constant amortization rate for existing debts.
A baseline deleveraging scenario motivated by the 
financial origin of the recent crisis is constructed by 
introducing a ‘credit crunch’ shock, represented as a 
permanent fall in the loan-to-value ratios faced by 
borrowers. This shock produces a sharp drop in real 
estate prices and, as a result, collateral values fall 
sufficiently so as to move the economy into an 
alternative debt regime, in which gross new credit 
suddenly stops and the stock of debt starts decaying 
at the contractual amortization rate (see Figure 1). The 
credit freeze depresses domestic demand and 
produces a protracted recession. At some point, the 
value of collateral relative to debt recovers sufficiently 
to justify new credit flows. This gives rise to an 
expansionary phase, characterized by a virtuous circle 
of higher borrowers’ net worth, increasing asset prices 
and new lending, that ultimately lead to positive growth 
and higher employment. Importantly, the time at which 
the economy switches from the deleveraging phase to 
the recovery phase is endogenous.
3  Labor and product market reforms: Some room for 
a positive impact in the short-run
Building upon the previous baseline scenario, the 
authors simulate the effects of permanent reductions in 
desired price and wage markups, as proxies for reforms 
in product and labor markets, respectively. In addition 
1  See e.g. M. Draghi (2014) “Unemployment in the Euro 
Area”, speech at the Annual Central Bank Symposium in 
Jackson Hole, 22nd August. 
2  Eggertsson G., A. Ferrero and A. Raffo, 2014. “Can structur-
al reforms help Europe?,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 
61(C), 2-22. 
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to the familiar long-run output gains in economic 
activity, it is found that this set of reforms can mitigate 
the short-run output and employment losses caused 
by the deleveraging shock, although the effectiveness 
of the reform in this respect varies depending on the 
market at hand.
First, stronger competition among firms in the product 
market, and the ensuing long-run gains in consumption 
and output, lead forward-looking households and firms 
to increase their investment in the short run, vis-à-vis 
the baseline (no-reform) scenario (see Figure 2). 
Stronger investment demand in turn alleviates the fall 
in real estate prices produced by the deleveraging 
shock with a positive impact on borrowers’ net worth 
and, hence, on investment. In this way, a faster recovery 
of their net worth allows borrowers to obtain fresh 
credit at an earlier date. That is, the reform brings 
forward the end of the deleveraging process and hence 
of the recession. These effects (more collateralized 
credit at an earlier date, and faster  exit from recession) 
lead borrowers to further increase their investment 
demand today, with the resulting boost to asset prices, 
collateral values, and so on.
By contrast, a labor market reform that reduces the 
wage markups by a similar magnitude, which yields 
long-run gains similar to those from the product market 
reform, produces more modest improvements in GDP 
in the short run (see Figure 3). Two factors explain this 
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difference. First, this reform makes labor cheaper 
relative to capital (equipment and commercial real 
estate), and hence does not produce a significant rise 
in the demand for real estate or in its price. As a 
consequence, neither collateral values, nor investment, 
nor the end of deleveraging are much affected. Second, 
unlike a reduction in price markups, a reduction in 
wage markups needs to overcome a double layer of 
nominal rigidities (wages and prices) before affecting 
actual production prices. In fact, a broader labor market 
reform that includes an increase in nominal wage 
flexibility turns out to be significantly more powerful in 
the short run, underlining the adverse effects of nominal 
wage rigidities on employment and output (see the 
broader reform path, show in beige, in Figure 3). 
The foreign sector plays an important role in shaping 
the short-run effects of reforms, in the sense that higher 
elasticities of exports and imports with respect to the 
terms of trade lead to larger short-run gains from 
reforms. In particular, under some counterfactual 
calibrations, labor market reforms may lead to some 
negative short-run effects on GDP and employment if 
price elasticities of trade flows are sufficiently low, 
whereas product market reforms seems significantly 
more robust to a more muted response of net exports. 
The reason is intuitive: the labor market reform conveys 
a negative impact on wages (this effect is positive under 
the product market reform), whose effect on domestic 
households’ disposable income may be large unless 
the positive reaction of employment is strong enough. 
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THE IMPACT OF A LABOR MARKET REFORM FIGURE 3 
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This last condition, in turn, requires a sufficiently large 
response of net exports.
4 Inspecting the mechanism
Collateral constraints and long-term debt play an 
important role, essentially, by buffering the short term 
impact of reform-driven changes in various prices, such 
as consumption and real estate prices, and the real 
interest rate. Interestingly, credit restrictions and long 
term debt mitigate the (negative) deflationary effects 
induced by the reforms. On one hand, the fact that the 
new credit flow freezes during the deleveraging phase 
implies that the increase in real interest rates brought by 
the reforms has little effect on domestic demand. On the 
other hand, since under long-term contracts debtors pay 
back only a small fraction of their outstanding debt each 
period, the deflation produced by the reform has only a 
second order effect on borrowers’ net debt flows and 
hence on their spending capacity.
Hence, somewhat paradoxically, a scenario of 
widespread financial tightness and long-term debt 
contracts may work as an anaesthetic for some of the 
short-term negative side-effects of reforms.
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The Great Recession (GR, henceforth) was of 
unprecedented severity and duration in the postwar 
US business cycle and led many economists to 
suspect a major breakdown in the data generating 
process of the GDP, possibily implying the end of the 
GM period2. A number of influential papers conjecture 
that the GM has ended as a consequence of 
accumulated disequilibria. That is, an excess of 
confidence led to excess leverage, which left the 
economy vulnerable to small shocks to asset prices 
(see Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2013, and 
Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov, 2013). Bean 
(2010) relates the end of the GM to a misperception of 
risk, while Williams and Taylor (2009) and Taylor (2010, 
2012) claim that the GM ended because of the “Great 
Deviation”. Empirically-oriented papers also conclude 
that the GM is over; see Ng and Tambalotti (2012); Ng 
and Wright (2013); Keating and Valcarcel (2012); and 
Canarella, Fang and Miller (2008). Against these 
arguments, Clark (2009) argues that the economy 
undergoes occasional shifts in volatility, although low 
volatility is the norm, which suggests that the GM is 
not over. 
For academics and policymakers, the question 
whether the GM has ended or continues is just as 
important as the original discovery of the GM. For the 
academic literature, a break in volatility matters for 
widely-used theoretical and empirical techniques, for 
example, in the estimation of state-space models of 
business cycle fluctuations; model calibration 
exercises; and the estimation of structural vector 
autoregression models over periods spanning the 
break. For policymakers, it is also crucial for predicting 
the expected magnitude of future expansions, the 
likelihood of sluggish or jobless recoveries, or other 
changes in business cycle characteristics. Therefore, 
given the relevance of the issue, a clear statement 
based on sound statistical procedures on whether the 
GM still holds is very much needed.
THE TWO GREATEST. GREAT RECESSION VS. GREAT 
MODERATION
MARÍA DOLORES GADEA, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS  
AND GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1423
The Great Recession of 2008 prompted debate about the 
possible end of the tranquil times of the Great Moderation. 
However, this paper presents evidence for the US 
economy that the decrease in volatility (the hallmark of 
the Great Moderation) seems to be quite a permanent 
phenomenon. Reduced volatility is detected even through 
the turmoil of the Great Recession, and would be 
detected even if this pattern of recession-recovery lasted 
for extended horizons. This fact has important implications 
for policymakers, and invites a reconsideration of the 
explanations of the Great Moderation, especially those 
related to good policy or good luck.
1  Introduction
The period of unusually stable macroeconomic 
activity experienced in the United States during the 
last decades of the 20th century is known as the 
Great Moderation (GM, henceforth). Kim and Nelson 
(1999) and McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000) were 
the first to document the substantial decline in US 
output volatility in the early 1980s. Recently, Furman 
(2014) called attention to the GM when he stated that 
“In the wake of the Great Recession, it is worth 
reassessing the Great Moderation hypothesis and 
understanding what it means for policy going 
forward”. The literature on the GM is prolific, and its 
possible causes continue to be a matter of lively 
debate. The explanations fall into three main 
categories, namely, changes in the structure of 
production, improved policy and good luck.
Prior to the recent economic crisis, the GM was seen 
as a permanent phenomenon. Blanchard and Simon 
(2001) concluded that “The decrease in output volatility 
appears sufficiently steady and broad based that a 
major reversal appears unlikely. This implies a much 
smaller likelihood of recessions...”. Lucas (2003) stated 
that the “central problem of depression-prevention has 
been solved, for all practical purposes”. In fact, since 
1984, the US had experienced only two relatively mild 
recessions, until the latest one1.
1  The National Bureau of Economic Research identifies three 
recessions since the beginning of the GM: 1990.3-1991.1, 
2001.1-2001.4, 2007.4-2009.2. 
2  From now on, by “GR” we refer to the period that comprises 
the recession that started in 2007.4 and its subsequent 
recovery, because we look for a permanent structural break in 
the data, not a temporary change associated just with the 
recession period. 
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of data. In no case do we find an additional structural 
break in the data associated with the GR, even when 
the data are extended by 15 more years. Obviously, the 
immediate interpretation of the results is that volatility 
has increased during the GR, but not by enough to 
indicate a return of the pre-GM volatility period. Next, 
to test this interpretation, we rescale the additional 
sample to equate its variance to that of the pre-GM 
period. An example is shown in red in Figure 2(a). Still, 
in most cases, the results show no additional break. At 
this stage, the question is how can it be that we fail to 
find an additional break, even if we add 15 years of 
data with the pre-GM volatility? Is there something 
wrong in the specification of the tests?
To address this question, we instead generate 15 years 
of artificial data by bootstrapping from the pre-GM 
sample. An example is shown in blue in Figure 2(a). 
Now, indeed, the test results change. Now, the GM is 
the only break found in only 5% of the new artificial 
datasets. In 40% no break is found, and the GM does 
not show up; in 40% an additional break is found, 
associated with the GR; and in the rest of the cases, 
there are random breaks not associated with the GM 
or the GR.
Thus, the difference between the pre-GM sample and 
the GR period seems not just related to the level of 
volatility. So what is the difference? The intuitive 
explanation can be seen in Figure 2, comparing the 
hypothetical future path bootstrapped from the pre-GM 
data (blue) with the path bootstrapped from the GR 
period and rescaled to match its variance to that of the 
pre-GM period (red). A look at each of these series, and 
their squared values in Figure 2(b), allows us to observe 
that the same volatility comes from two very different 
paths. On the one hand, the pre-GM series (blue line) 
reflects a fairly uniform increase of volatility. On the 
other hand, the GR series normalized with the pre-GM 
volatility (red line) shows that the rise in volatility is 
caused by extreme recessionary events. It is worth 
noting that, outside of these recessions, the volatility 
remains greatly reduced. Coming back to the postulated 
2  Statistical methods and results 
The quarterly US GDP growth rate is plotted in Figure 1. 
Several challenges come to mind when we wish to 
analyze whether or not the GM has come to an end. 
First, unlike the original papers that detected the GM, 
we are looking for more than one break in the data. We 
should find a break for the GM and, if the GM has ended, 
an additional break associated to the GR. Second, if an 
additional break exists, it would show up at the end of 
the sample, when a structural break test is less powerful. 
Third, if this additional break exists at the end of the 
sample, the sample could be too short, implying 
imprecise estimates of the dynamic behavior after the 
break, making it difficult to find statistically significant 
differences with respect to the previous periods. These 
three challenges: several breaks, end-of-sample lack of 
power, and short sample uncertainty make it hard to 
test for additional structural breaks.
In Gadea, Gómez-Loscos and Pérez-Quirós (2014) we 
carefully analyze all these technical issues. For the 
problem of identifying multiple breaks, instead of the 
Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) 
tests, we apply Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a,b), and 
Inclan and Tiao (1994). While these tests permit more 
than one break, the only one we find is the break 
associated with the GM. We find no evidence of 
additional breaks associated with the GR.
To deal with the end-of-sample problem, we propose 
an experiment where we consider what the structural 
break tests would have found if the GR had started in 
any period from 1984.2 to 2007.3, instead of 2007.4. 
Regardless of where we place the GR sample, the tests 
fail to find an end of the GM.
The small sample problem is solved by generating an 
artificial additional sample with simulated data using a 
stationary bootstrap of the GR sample. We add 5, 10 or 
15 years of data that have the same properties as the 
GR data and we generate 10,000 simulations, i.e. 
10,000 US economies enlarged with 5, 10 or 15 years 
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explanations of the GM, it seems acceptable to exclude 
good luck or even good policy playing a primary role in 
an economy such as that shown by the red line. 
With respect to the depth of the last recession, we 
carry out an exercise in which we compare the growth 
rate of the GDP series during the last recession with the 
growth rate of the pre-GM data. We compute a 
Wilcoxon rank sum test and find that we cannot reject 
that the observations of the last recession come from 
the same distribution as those of the pre-GM recessions. 
This strongly suggests that, contrary to the predominant 
opinion, the GM is only linked to the characteristics of 
expansion periods. Finally, therefore, we investigate 
which features of the GM expansions make them 
fundamentally different from the pre-GM ones.
The existing literature has focused on the shape of the 
recoveries, because it has crucial implications for 
the stochastic properties of the GDP growth series, 
long-term economic activity and job creation capacity. 
Some authors claim that the peak-reverting phase of 
the business cycle, during which output reverts to its 
long-run trend, with intense job creation (as opposed to 
the apathetic recoveries since the nineties, with 
sluggish job creation) disappeared after the mid-
eighties3. However, the severity of an episode such as 
the GR, unprecedented in the GM times, leaves the 
door open to a possible transformation in the shape of 
recoveries. According to Morley and Piger (2006), the 
3  See Camacho, Pérez-Quirós and Rodriguez-Mendizabal 
(2011) and Ng and Wright (2013). 
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The GM was originally associated with a decrease in 
output volatility and was considered a great 
achievement in terms of reducing risk and of decreasing 
the frequency and depth of recessions, which was, in 
turn, linked to good luck or good policies. However, 
after carefully analyzing the characteristics of the GM, 
they seem to be more clearly associated with the shape 
of expansions. Perhaps the benefits associated with an 
apparent increase in stability are paid for at a very high 
price. Feeble expansions may be the price to pay for 
low volatility.
sluggish recoveries of the first two recessions of the 
GM were basically linked to the fact that these two 
recessions were mild. However, even though the GR 
was powerful, and comparable to the pre-GM 
recessions, we find that the first year of the expansion 
is clearly different from the pre-GM ones. We check this 
using the Wilcoxon rank sum test, and clearly reject the 
null hypothesis that the first year of the last expansion 
is equal to the first year of the pre-GM expansions. 
However, this is not the case for the second and third 
year of expansions.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 RESEARCH UPDATE, FALL 2014
2014 WORKING PAPERS
LINK TO WORKING PAPERS PAGE
COUNTRIES’ SAFETY AND COMPETITIVENESS, AND THE 
ESTIMATION OF CURRENT ACCOUNT MISALIGNMENTS
TERESA SASTRE AND FRANCESCA VIANI
WORKING PAPER Nº 1401
Current account imbalances and their sustainability are 
among the most debated international policy issues. 
Through the recently designed External Balance 
Assessment methodology (EBA), the IMF estimates the 
impact of several countries’ fundamentals and policies 
on their current account balance, calculates 
misalignments in their current account position and 
indicates policy recommendations which, if implemented, 
should contribute to reducing these imbalances.
In this paper, we explore some extensions to the EBA, 
following two courses. First, we distinguish in current 
account regressions between countries that are 
considered safe investment destinations and non-safe 
economies. Since this distinction is likely to acquire 
special relevance in periods of global turmoil, we also 
distinguish between periods of global stress and 
tranquil times. Second, we embed in EBA regressions 
variables that drive countries’ external competitiveness.
Results show that current account dynamics may be 
affected by competitiveness factors and differ 
significantly between safe and non-safe economies, 
with such differences becoming particularly relevant in 
turbulent times. These findings suggest that EBA 
regressions may be overlooking the influence of 
countries’ safety and competitiveness on external 
balances. Our alternative misalignment estimations 
show larger imbalances than those calculated with the 
EBA for some Asian economies and smaller imbalances 
for some high-surplus EU countries.
SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKETS IN TURBULENT TIMES:  
CREDITOR DISCRIMINATION AND CROWDING-OUT EFFECTS
FERNANDO BRONER, AITOR ERCE, ALBERTO MARTIN  
AND JAUME VENTURA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1402
TIn 2007, countries in the euro periphery were enjoying 
stable growth, low deficits and low spreads. Then the 
financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep 
recession, raising their deficits and debt levels. By 
2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads 
increased and, surprisingly, so did the share of the debt 
held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocated from 
the private to the public sector, reducing investment 
and deepening the recession even further. To account 
for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign 
risk in which debt can be traded in secondary markets. 
The model has two key ingredients: creditor 
discrimination and crowding-out effects. Creditor 
discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, 
sovereign debt offers a higher expected return to 
domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This provides 
incentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-
out effects arise because private borrowing is limited 
by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt 
purchases displace productive investment. The model 
shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, 
and may lead to self-fulfilling crises. It also shows how 
crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other 
countries in the euro zone, and how they may be 
addressed by policies at the European level.
THE STRUCTURE OF SUB-NATIONAL PUBLIC DEBT:  
LIQUIDITY VS CREDIT RISKS
JAVIER J. PÉREZ AND ROCÍO PRIETO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1403
We analyse the determinants of the structure of public 
debt in the case of Spain, from a sub-national 
perspective. The endogenous shift in the composition 
of debt (among short vs long-term instruments, and 
loans vs securities) depends on observable measures 
of credit and liquidity risks. To discriminate among 
competing potential determinants, we set out empirical 
models that incorporate financial, economic and 
institutional variables. We estimate the models by GMM 
and make use of a new quarterly dataset of Spanish 
regional governments’ debt structure for the period 
1995Q1-2012Q4. Our results show that the most robust 
determinants of regional public financial management 
decisions, as reflected by the structure of debt, are 
rollover risks and the expectation of central government 
support (as measured by the dynamics of transfers).
PUBLICATIONS 
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corporations. This finding may be due to the fact that 
judicial (in)efficacy can be regarded as a fixed cost to 
be paid by the agents that litigate. Hence, the economic 
activity of entrepreneurs - and specifically, their entry 
into the market - is expected to be more affected than 
that of larger firms.
DO THE DRIVERS OF LOAN DOLLARISATION DIFFER BETWEEN 
CESEE AND LATIN AMERICA? A META-ANALYSIS
MARIYA HAKE, FERNANDO LÓPEZ-VICENTE AND LUIS MOLINA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1406
In this paper we compare the determinants of loan 
dollarisation in two emerging market regions, namely 
Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) 
and Latin America, by means of a meta-analysis of 32 
studies that provide around 1,200 estimated coefficients 
for six drivers of foreign currency lending. One common 
pattern we identify is that macroeconomic instability 
(as expressed by inflation volatility) and banks’ funding 
in foreign currency play a significant role in explaining 
loan dollarisation in both regions. By contrast, the 
interest rate differential appears to be a key determinant 
only in Latin America, while the positive impact of 
exchange rate volatility on dollarisation implies a more 
prominent role for supply factors in the CESEE region. 
While the robustness of the results has been verified, 
our meta-analysis shows that estimates reported in the 
literature tend to be influenced by study characteristics 
such as the methodology applied and the data used.
PRICE-COST MARK-UPS IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY:  
A MICROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO AND ALBERTO URTASUN
WORKING PAPER Nº 1407
This paper explores the dynamics of price-cost mark-
ups using firm-level data, paying particular attention to 
the crisis period 2008-2011. To this end, we apply the 
econometric framework developed by Klette (1999) to 
a comprehensive sample of Spanish non-financial 
corporations in order to estimate price-cost mark-ups 
for the period 1995-2011 at the aggregate and sectoral 
levels. The results reveal a widespread pattern of 
increasing price-cost mark-ups since 2008, both by 
industry and firm size. Moreover, with the aim of 
interpreting the pattern identified in our findings, we 
also relate the changes in our industry level estimates 
of price-cost margins between 2007 and 2011 to some 
relevant industry characteristics suggested by the 
literature, with an emphasis on the extent of market 
power and of financial pressure. We find a positive and 
statistically significant association between the growth 
MEASURING BANK COMPETITION IN CHINA: A COMPARISON 
OF NEW VERSUS CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES APPLIED TO 
LOAN MARKETS
BING XU, ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL AND MICHIEL VAN LEUVENSTEIJN
WORKING PAPER Nº 1404
Since the 1980s, important and progressive reforms 
have profoundly reshaped the structure of the Chinese 
banking system. Many empirical studies suggest that 
financial reform promoted bank competition in most 
mature and emerging economies. However, some 
earlier studies that adopted conventional approaches 
to measure competition concluded that bank 
competition in China declined during the past decade, 
despite these reforms. In this paper, we show both 
empirically and theoretically that this apparent 
contradiction is the result of flawed measurement. 
Conventional indicators such as the Lerner index and 
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic fail to measure competition in 
Chinese loan markets properly due to the system of 
interest rate regulation. By contrast, the relatively new 
Profit Elasticity (PE) approach that was introduced in 
Boone (2008) as Relative Profit Differences (RPD) does 
not evidence these shortcomings. Using balance sheet 
information for a large sample of banks operating in 
China during 1996-2008, we show that competition 
actually increased in the past decade when the PE 
indicator is used. We provide additional empirical 
evidence that supports our results. We find that these, 
firstly, are in line with the process of financial reform, as 
measured by several indices, and secondly are robust 
for a large number of alternative specifications and 
estimation methods. All in all, our analysis suggests 
that bank lending markets in China have been more 
competitive than previously assumed.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS: 
DISAGGREGATED EVIDENCE FOR SPAIN
MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA AND JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI
WORKING PAPER Nº 1405
Entry of new firms, both in the form of entrepreneurs 
and corporations, fosters competition and productivity. 
The entry of firms and productivity have both been low 
in the Spanish economy over recent years. This paper 
analyses the determinants of entry focusing on the role 
of the design and efficacy of enforcement institutions 
(the judicial system), an aspect traditionally overlooked. 
To do this, we exploit disaggregated data at the local 
level in Spain. We find that higher judicial efficacy 
increases the entry rate of firms, while it has no effect 
on the exit rate. Crucially, that impact only occurs in the 
case of the entry rates for entrepreneurs, defined as 
self-employed, but not in the case of limited liability 
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a significantly sharp decline in liquidity, trading and 
price efficiency of medium-sized banks’ stocks relative 
to other stocks. 
CONSUMPTION IN THE SHADOW OF UNEMPLOYMENT
RODOLFO G. CAMPOS AND ILIANA REGGIO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1411
By how much do employed households reduce their 
consumption when the aggregate unemployment rate 
rises? In Spain during the Great Recession a 1 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate 
was related to a strong drop in household consumption 
of more than 0.7% per equivalent adult. This reduction 
is the response of forward-looking agents to downward 
revisions of their expectations on future income growth 
rates: the shadow of unemployment. Using 
consumption panel data that include information on 
physical quantities, we show that the drop in 
consumption expenditure was indeed a reduction in 
quantities, and not a switch to cheaper alternatives.
WHEN DOES CASH MATTER? EVIDENCE FOR PRIVATE FIRMS
PAUL EHLING AND DAVID HAUSHALTER 
WORKING PAPER Nº 1412
Using a database of more than 180,000 private 
companies from 2000 to 2009, we find that the benefits 
of holding more cash vary substantially with a firm’s 
size and the conditions it faces. Cash holdings matter 
most for small firms: when there are negative shocks to 
industry or macroeconomic conditions, a small firm’s 
cash holdings are positively associated with changes in 
its sales and assets. Cash is less important for other 
conditions. Differences in the benefits of cash holdings 
between large and small firms are traced to a firm’s 
ability – and willingness – to increase leverage when 
there is a cash shortfall. 
CORRELATIONS
PAUL EHLING AND CHRISTIAN HEYERDAHL-LARSEN
WORKING PAPER Nº 1413
Correlations of equity securities have varied 
substantially over time and remain a source of 
continuing policy debate. This paper studies stock 
market correlations in an equilibrium model with 
heterogeneous risk aversion. In the model, preference 
heterogeneity causes countercyclical variations in the 
volatility of aggregate risk aversion. At times of high 
volatility of aggregate risk aversion, which is a common 
factor in r turns, we see high correlations. The calibrated 
rate of estimated mark-ups and both our direct measure 
of market power and our proxy of financial pressure.
FISCAL POLICIES IN SPAIN: MAIN STYLISED FACTS REVISITED 
FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FRANCISCO MARTÍ, ANTONIO MONTESINOS, 
JAVIER J. PÉREZ AND A. JESÚS SÁNCHEZ-FUENTES
WORKING PAPER Nº 1408
We provide key stylised facts on fiscal policy 
developments in Spain over the past three decades 
using quarterly data (1986Q1-2012Q2). First, we 
compute stylised facts on the cyclical properties of 
fiscal policies over that period. Next, we report updated 
evidence on the macroeconomic effects of non-
systematic fiscal policies, including updated estimates 
of their macroeconomic impact (fiscal multipliers) for 
alternative datasets. To perform the analysis in the 
paper we built up a comprehensive database of 
seasonally adjusted quarterly fiscal variables for the 
period of interest.
THIRD-COUNTRY RELATIONS IN THE DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHING 
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION OF 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
MARÍA J. NIETO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1409
This article presents a critical analysis of the principles 
behind the scope and forms of cooperation between 
EU Member States and third-country resolution 
authorities in the context of the 2014 Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive. The article also explores the 
future responsibilities of the prospective Single 
Resolution Authority regarding relations between the 
euro area and third-country resolution.
SHORT-SALE CONSTRAINTS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH MARKET
ÓSCAR ARCE AND SERGIO MAYORDOMO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1410
We examine the effect of the short-selling ban in 2011 
on Spanish stocks on the level of risk in the banking 
sector. Before the ban, short positions were found to 
be positive and significantly related to the 
creditworthiness of medium-sized banks, these being 
generally less internationally diversified and more 
reliant on official support. We show that the ban helped 
stabilise the credit risk of medium-sized banks, 
especially those more exposed to short-sellers’ activity, 
but not that of large banks and non-financial 
corporations. This stabilising effect came at the cost of 
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monitoring of the Spanish government’s borrowing 
requirement. Spain has been at the centre of the recent 
European sovereign debt crisis, not least because of 
sizeable failures in meeting public deficit targets. The 
system comprises a suite of models, with different 
levels of disaggregation (bottom-up vs top-down; 
general government vs sub-sectors), which are suitable 
for the automatic processing of the large amount of 
monthly/quarterly fiscal data currently published by the 
Spanish statistical authorities. Our tools are instrumental 
in the ex-ante detection of risks to official projections, 
and can thus help reduce the ex-post reputational 
costs of budgetary slippage. On the basis of our results, 
we discuss how official monitoring bodies could 
expand, on one hand, their toolkit to evaluate regular 
adherence to targets (moving beyond a legalistic 
approach) and, on the other, their communication 
policies as regards sources of risks to (ex-ante) 
compliance with budgetary targets.
FROM BISMARCK TO BEVERIDGE: THE OTHER PENSION 
REFORM IN SPAIN
J. IGNACIO CONDE-RUIZ AND CLARA I. GONZÁLEZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1417
Aging is an unstoppable process and it remains a major 
challenge for the sustainability of the PAYG pension 
system in most developed countries, including in 
Spain. Many countries need to introduce reforms of 
their pension systems in order to control their 
expenditure, and in some cases this has already begun. 
However, there are other sorts of changes to certain 
parameters that are perceived as secondary, e.g. the 
different path of minimum and maximum pensions, and 
the upper and lower caps on contributions. This has 
significant implications for the distributive structure of 
the social security system that cannot be readily 
perceived by the population. That is why some 
economists in Spain refer to it as the “Silent Reform”. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the consequences 
this type of reform would have in Spain; indeed, it is the 
first paper to actually quantify and evaluate the potential 
impact it would have on the country. We have used an 
accounting model with heterogeneous agents and 
overlapping generations in order to project pension 
expenditures up until 2070. The results show that this 
kind of reform could potentially contain future 
expenditure and could also change the nature of the 
pension system from a contributory or Bismarckian-
type system into an assistential or Beveridgean-type 
one. This change could have significant consequences 
as both systems have different objectives. The paper 
also shows that the institutional characteristics that 
make this kind of reform in Spain feasible are also 
model matches average industry return correlations 
and changes in correlations from business cycle peaks 
to troughs, and replicates the cyclical dynamics of 
expected excess returns and standard deviations. A 
proxy for model-implied aggregate risk aversion jointly 
explains average industry correlations, expected 
excess returns, standard deviations and turnover 
volatility in the data. We find supportive evidence for 
the model’s prediction that industries with low dividend-
consumption correlation have low average return 
correlation but experience disproportionate increases 
in return correlations in recessions. 
BANKING CRISES AND SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS IN EMERGING 
MARKETS: EXPLORING THE LINKS
IRINA BALTEANU AND AITOR ERCE 
WORKING PAPER Nº 1414
See Features section.
HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND UNCERTAINTY: PRIVATE 
CONSUMPTION AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION
ÁNGEL ESTRADA, DANIEL GARROTE, EVA VALDEOLIVAS  
AND JAVIER VALLÉS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1415
Household debt in many advanced economies has 
increased significantly since the 1980s and accelerated 
in the years prior to the Great Recession, resulting in 
an aggregate reduction of saving rates in the developed 
economies. Some of those economies are now 
deleveraging, which may be affecting their recovery. 
We try to disentangle how these financial developments 
influence private consumption in a panel of OECD 
countries, after controlling for the traditional 
determinants (income, net financial and non-financial 
wealth, and interest rates). Consistent with the 
changes in the distribution of financial constraints, we 
find that aggregate consumption is also driven by the 
dynamics of housing debt accumulation and 
deleveraging. Precautionary savings, due to labour 
income uncertainty, have also influenced household 
decisions especially, during the 2007-2009 period. 
A TOOLKIT TO STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT BUDGET 
SURVEILLANCE
DIEGO J. PEDREGAL, JAVIER J. PÉREZ AND  
A. JESÚS SÁNCHEZ-FUENTES
WORKING PAPER Nº 1416
In this paper we develop a comprehensive short-term 
fiscal forecasting system of use for the real-time 
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businesses (wholesale, manufacturing). This result 
suggests that the monitoring effort by the tax authorities 
and the traceability of the information reported by firms 
are complements, and both are necessary for effective 
tax enforcement. Finally, we provide suggestive 
evidence that firms under low monitoring effort also 
misreport their material and labour expenditures to 
evade taxes, even in the presence of third-party 
reporting.
THE AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT OF PENSION EXPENDITURES 
IN SPAIN: AN EVALUATION OF THE 2013 PENSION REFORM
ALFONSO R. SÁNCHEZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1420
See Features section.
STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN A DEBT OVERHANG
JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE AND CARLOS THOMAS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1421
See Features section. 
THE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE PREMIUM IN SPAIN: EVIDENCE 
FROM LONGITUDINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
LAURA HOSPIDO AND ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1422
This paper studies the public sector wage gap in Spain 
by gender, skill level and type of contract, using recent 
administrative data from tax records. We estimate 
wage distributions in the presence of covariates 
separately for men and women in the public and in the 
private sectors, and we take advantage of the 
longitudinal structure of the data to control for selection. 
We find a positive public wage premium for men and 
women even after accounting for characteristics and 
endogenous selection; the observed average gap in 
hourly wages of 35 log points is reduced to 20 when 
accounting for observed characteristics, and to 10 
once endogenous selection is also taken into 
consideration. We also find substantial variation in the 
public premium along the wage distribution once 
observed characteristics are accounted for. This 
variation, however, is offset by opposite patterns of 
selection into the public sector: while we observe 
positive selection into the public sector at the bottom 
of the wage distribution, workers at the top of the 
distribution select negatively into the public sector. 
present in most developed countries with Bismarckian 
pension systems. Therefore, we believe that the lessons 
learned in this paper on this kind of reform could well 
prove useful to other countries.
SIGNALLING FISCAL STRESS IN THE EURO AREA:  
A COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS, GERRIT B. KOESTER,  
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO AND CHRISTIANE NICKEL
WORKING PAPER Nº 1418
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has raised 
interest in early warning indicators, aimed at signalling 
the build-up of fiscal stress in advance and helping 
prevent crises by means of a timely counteraction of 
fiscal and macroeconomic policies. This paper presents 
possible improvements to enhance existing early 
warning indicators for fiscal stress, especially for the 
euro area. We show that a country-specific approach 
could strongly increase the signalling power of early 
warning systems. Finally, we draw policy conclusions 
for the setting-up and application of a system of early 
warning indicators for fiscal stress.
HETEROGENEOUS RESPONSES TO EFFECTIVE TAX 
ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM SPANISH FIRMS
MIGUEL ALMUNIA AND DAVID LÓPEZ-RODRÍGUEZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1419
This paper investigates the effects of monitoring the 
information trails generated by firms’ activities in order 
to improve tax compliance. We use quasi-experimental 
variation provided by a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in 
Spain to empirically test the theoretical predictions on 
firms’ responses to an increase in monitoring effort. 
Firms with more than €6 million in reported revenue are 
monitored by the LTU, which devotes more resources 
to verifying the transactions reported by those firms. 
Using financial statements from practically the entire 
universe of Spanish firms for the period 1999-2007, we 
find substantial bunching of firms just below the LTU 
threshold. On average, we estimate that bunchers 
reduce their reported revenue by €101,000 (1.7% of 
total revenue) to avoid falling in the high enforcement 
regime. Adjusting for resource costs of evasion faced 
by firms, we estimate that the marginal bunching firm 
reduces its reported revenue by up to €593,000 (9.9%). 
The response is weak in sectors where most sales are 
made to final consumers (retail, restaurants) and strong 
in sectors where firms sell intermediate goods to other 
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SENTANDO LAS BASES DE LA POLÍTICA MACROPRUDENCIAL: 
DE LAS FALENCIAS PRE-LEHMAN A LOS DESAFÍOS  
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SYSTEMIC RISK, MONETARY AND MACROPRUDENTIAL  
POLICY
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ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 26, MAY 2014, 49-71.
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ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 26, MAY 2014, 73-107.
FINANCIAL DISINTERMEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 
AND GLOBAL BANKS FUNDING MODELS
JOSÉ MARÍA SERENA GARRALDA
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 26, MAY 2014, 109-132.
A FIRST APPROACH TO CREDITOR MONITORING,  
THE PARADOXICAL MISSING LEVER OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN SPAIN
CARLOS ARA
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 26, MAY 2014, 133-154.
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SHORT-TERM FORECASTING FOR EMPIRICAL ECONOMISTS. 
A SURVEY OF THE RECENTLY PROPOSED ALGORITHMS 
G. PÉREZ QUIRÓS, M. CAMACHO AND P. PONCELA 
FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN ECONOMETRICS, 6 (2), NOVEMBER 
2013, 101-161
SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKETS IN TURBULENT TIMES:  
CREDITOR DISCRIMINATION AND CROWDING-OUT  
EFFECTS
F. BRONER, A. ERCE, A. MARTIN AND J. VENTURA
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 61, JANUARY 2014, 114-142.
THE TWO GREATEST. GREAT RECESSION VS. GREAT 
MODERATION 
MARÍA DOLORES GADEA-RIVAS, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS  
AND GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1423
See Features section. 
THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL (DE)REGULATION ON CURRENT 
ACCOUNT BALANCES 
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO AND OLIVER ROEHN
WORKING PAPER Nº 1424
Global imbalances and financial market (de)regulation 
both feature prominently among the potential causes of 
the global financial crisis, but they have been generally 
discussed separately. In this paper, we take a different 
angle and investigate the relationship between financial 
market regulation and current account balances, an 
area for which there is limited empirical evidence. We 
use a panel of countries over the period 1980-2010 and 
employ a novel empirical approach which allows us to 
simultaneously account for model uncertainty, current 
account persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. 
We find robust evidence that financial market 
regulations affect current account balances and that 
different aspects of these regulations can have 
opposing effects on the current account. In particular 
we find that lowering bank entry barriers is negatively 
associated with the current account balance. In 
contrast, bank privatisation and securities market 
deregulation tend to raise current account balances. 
Our results also highlight the need to control for 
persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. Once we 
control for these factors, we find robust evidence for a 
wide range of current account theories in contrast to 
previous studies.
FINANCIAL STABILITY JOURNAL
The Financial Stability Journal (Revista de Estabilidad 
Financiera) is published biannually by the Banco de 
España, with the aim of disseminating and participating 
in discussions on issues related to financial stability, 
with special emphasis on regulation and prudential 
supervision. Its board of editors comprises internal and 
external professionals. All articles appearing in the 
journal, which may be authored by Banco de España 
staff or researchers from other institutions, are refereed 
by at least one member of the board of editors.
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REAL-TIME FORECASTING US GDP FROM SMALL SCALE 
FACTOR MODELS
M.CAMACHO AND J. MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN
EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS, 47 (1), AUGUST 2014, 347-364.
RETIREMENT PATTERNS OF COUPLES IN EUROPE
L. HOSPIDO AND G. ZAMARRO
IZA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LABOR STUDIES, 3 (12), JUNE 2014.
CUMPLIMIENTO NORMATIVO Y BANCA CENTRAL. ANÁLISIS 
COMPARADO DE LA CONVENIENCIA DE IMPLANTAR UNA 
FUNCIÓN DE CUMPLIMIENTO («COMPLIANCE») EN BANCA 
CENTRAL,  SOBRE LA BASE DE LA REGULACIÓN APLICABLE  
A ENTIDADES DE CRÉDITO Y EMPRESAS DE SERVICIOS DE 
INVERSIÓN. DE MIFID A BASILEA III/CRD IV
A. DE LA MATA
REVISTA DE DERECHO BANCARIO Y BURSÁTIL, 33 (133), JANUARY-
MARCH 2014, 233-268
HAZARDOUS TIMES FOR MONETARY POLICY: WHAT DO 
TWENTY-THREE MILLION BANK LOANS SAY ABOUT THE 
EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY ON CREDIT RISK-TAKING?
G. JIMÉNEZ, S. ONGENA, J. L. PEYDRÓ AND J. SAURINA
ECONOMETRICA, 82 (2), MARCH 2014, 463-505
COMMODITY PRICES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN LATIN 
AMERICA. LIVING AND DYING BY COMMODITIES?
G. PÉREZ QUIRÓS AND M. CAMACHO
EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE, 50 (2), MARCH- 
APRIL 2014, 110-137
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH-SYSTEM EFFICIENCY:  
EVIDENCE FROM OECD COUNTRIES
P. HERNÁNDEZ DE COS AND E. MORAL-BENITO
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND 
ECONOMICS, 14 (1), MARCH 2014, 69-93
THE EFFECT ON COMPETITION OF BANKING SECTOR 
CONSOLIDATION FOLLOWING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS  
OF 2008
C. PÉREZ MONTES
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 43, JUNE 2014, 124-136
CROSS-BORDER BANKING, EXTERNALITIES AND SOVEREIGN 
DISTRESS: DOES THE EURO NEED A COMMON BANKING 
AUTHORITY?
A. ERCE
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, 19 (3),  
JULY 2014, 188-203
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THE FAILURE TO PREDICT THE GREAT RECESSION.  
A VIEW THROUGH THE ROLE OF CREDIT
G. PÉREZ-QUIRÓS AND M.D. GADEA
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
EXTRACTING NONLINEAR SIGNALS FROM SEVERAL ECONOMIC 
INDICATORS
G. PÉREZ-QUIRÓS, M. CAMACHO AND P. PONCELA
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS
CAN WE USE SEASONALLY ADJUSTED VARIABLES  
IN DYNAMIC FACTOR MODELS?
G. PÉREZ-QUIRÓS, M. CAMACHO AND Y. LOVCHA
STUDIES IN NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND ECONOMETRICS
LIQUIDITY, TERM SPREADS AND MONETARY POLICY
H. BASSO AND Y. AKSOY
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
RISK FACTORS AND THE MATURITY OF SUBNATIONAL DEBT: 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION FOR THE CASE OF SPAIN
J. J. PÉREZ, AND R. PRIETO
PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW
RECENT REFORMS IN SPANISH HOUSING MARKETS:  
AN EVALUATION USING A DSGE MODEL
J. S. MORA-SANGUINETTI AND M. RUBIO
ECONOMIC MODELLING
DOES (AVERAGE) SIZE MATTER? COURT ENFORCEMENT, 
BUSINESS DEMOGRAPHY AND FIRM GROWTH
M. GARCÍA-POSADA AND J. S. MORA-SANGUINETTI
SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS: 
DISAGGREGATED EVIDENCE FOR SPAIN.
M. GARCÍA-POSADA AND J. S. MORA-SANGUINETTI 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
RETURNS TO SKILLS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES: 
SPAIN 1995–2010
R. CARRASCO, J. F. JIMENO AND C. ORTEGA
OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
MINIMUM WAGES: DO THEY REALLY HURT YOUNG PEOPLE?
S. GALÁN AND S. PUENTE
THE B.E. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY
OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND THE US ECONOMY: WHAT MAKES  
THE LATEST OIL PRICE EPISODE DIFFERENT
M. D. GADEA AND A. GÓMEZ-LOSCOS
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS LETTERS, 3 (2), SUMMER 2014, 36-44
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH STATE-DEPENDENT PRICING
A. NAKOV AND C. THOMAS
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CENTRAL BANKING 10 (3), SEPTEMBER 
2014, 49-94.
FISCAL POLICY ANALYSIS IN THE EURO AREA: EXPANDING  
THE TOOLKIT
J. PAREDES, D. J. PEDREGAL AND J. J. PÉREZ
JOURNAL OF POLICY MODELING, 36 (5), SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2014, 
800-823
FORTHCOMING ARTICLES  
IN REFEREED JOURNALS
BANKING ON SENIORITY: THE IMF AND THE SOVEREIGNS’ 
PRIVATE CREDITORS
A. ERCE
GOVERNANCE 
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS AND THE IMF: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OFFICIAL INTERVENTIONS
A. ERCE
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS
A TWIN CRISIS WITH MULTIPLE BANKS OF ISSUE
A. MORO, G. NUÑO AND P. TEDDE
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
IS INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL PRODUCTIVE? A DYNAMIC 
HETEROGENEOUS APPROACH
C. CALDERÓN, E. MORAL-BENITO AND L. SERVÉN
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS
MODEL AVERAGING IN ECONOMICS: AN OVERVIEW
E. MORAL-BENITO
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS
GROWTH EMPIRICS IN PANEL DATA MODELS UNDER MODEL 
UNCERTAINTY AND WEAK EXOGENEITY
E. MORAL-BENITO
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS
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RECENT CONFERENCES
LINK TO CONFERENCES PAGE
EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM IN INTERNATIONAL 
MACROECONOMICS (ESSIM 2014)
RODA DE BARÁ, TARRAGONA; 27-30 MAY 2014
Towards the end of May, 2014, the Banco de España 
hosted the twenty-second edition of ESSIM (the 
European Summer Symposium in International 
Macroeconomics) in its facilities at Roda de Bará, in the 
province of Tarragona. The  conference is an annual 
event of the CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy 
Research), and has been organized jointly with the 
Banco de España every other year for two decades. 
The conference is intended as an opportunity for 
macroeconomists from European countries, especially 
younger researchers, to get to know each other and to 
meet key economists from the rest of the world, and to 
establish collaborative research projects. 
The papers presented at the conferences addressed a 
variety of macroeconomic questions, from theoretical, 
empirical and policy-oriented perspectives. Issues 
receiving special attention in 2014 included fiscal 
policy, international trade, unemployment and 
inequality, financial market imperfections, and the 
recent financial and sovereign debt crises. Two 
presentations of particular relevance in the current 
economic situation included a talk by Fridrik Mar 
Baldursson (Univ. of Reykjavik) and Richard Portes 
(London Business School) describing the collapse of 
the Icelandic banking system, and a talk by Javier 
Suárez (CEMFI) on a macroeconomic model, developed 
by a team of Eurosystem economists, designed to 
analyze the effects of leverage and defaults in different 
parts of the economy. 
The ESSIM conference is also an opportunity for 
interaction between Banco de España staff, economists 
from other central banks, and academic researchers. 
The conference programme included presentations by 
Ernesto Villanueva (Banco de España, Dept. of Monetary 
and Financial Studies) on European household debt, 
and by Carlos Thomas (Banco de España, Dept. of 
Economic Analysis and Forecasting) on structural 
reforms in an economy that is undergoing deleveraging. 
Papers presented at the conference can be downloaded 
from the Banco de España website here.
THIRD JOINT WORKSHOP ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS
MADRID, 9-10 JUNE 2014
In June 2014, the Banco de España hosted the third 
edition of a workshop, jointly organized with the Bank 
of Canada, on international financial markets. The 
workshop provides a forum for researchers from 
academia and central banks to discuss topics such as 
international asset pricing, exchange rates, and capital 
flows; international monetary policy spillovers; and the 
impact of regulation and policy on international financial 
markets. 
The workshop included sessions on unconventional 
monetary policy, flight to safer and more liquid assets, 
asset pricing, commodities markets, bank regulation 
reforms, and sovereign risk. Conference organizers 
included Antonio Diez de los Ríos and Jean Sebastiene 
Fontaine of the Bank of Canada, and José Manuel 
Marqués, Ricardo Gimeno, and José María Serena of 
the Banco de España. 
THIRD JOINT WORLD BANK – BANCO DE ESPAÑA RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE
MADRID, 23-24 JUNE 2014
On June 23-24, the Banco de España hosted a 
conference entitled “Financing growth: Levers, 
Boosters and Brakes” at its headquarters in Madrid. 
The conference, which is the third in a series jointly 
organized with the World Bank, brought together 
academics and policy makers to discuss the nexus 
between finance and growth. In particular, it addressed 
the conditions under which finance is more likely to 
EVENTS
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FINANCIAL INNOVATION IN SOVEREIGN BORROWING AND PUBLIC 
PROVISION OF LIQUIDITY
PATRICIA GÓMEZ
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
27 JANUARY 2014
MORTGAGE AMORTIZATION AND WELFARE
CHIARA FORLATI
École Polythecnique Fédérale de Lausanne
28 JANUARY 2014
SECURITIZATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION OVER  
THE BUSINESS CYCLE
MARTIN KUNCL
CERGE-EI
29 JANUARY 2014
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND SOVEREIGN DEFAULT
ELENA RANCOITA
University of Mannheim
30 JANUARY 2014
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
MULTIPLIER AND WELFARE
KSENIA KOLOSKOVA
Bocconi University
31 JANUARY 2014
THE SLOWDOWN IN BUSINESS EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS:  
THE ROLE OF CHANGING SKILL DEMAND
ISABEL CAIRO
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
3 FEBRUARY 2014
FOREIGN CURRENCY DEBT AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY:  
IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE EXCHANGE RATE IN COMPLETING 
MARKETS?
DANIEL OSORIO
London School of Economics
4 FEBRUARY 2014
MONETARY POLICY AND DEFAULTS IN THE US
MICHELE PIFFER
London School of Economics
5 FEBRUARY 2014
support investment, innovation and productivity 
growth, and the role of monetary, macroprudential and 
regulatory policies in achieving these goals. 
The workshop included sessions on foreign investment; 
credit markets, institutions and growth; macroprudential 
and regulatory policy; banks, innovation and growth; 
and the growth implications of financial disequilibria. 
The keynote speech was delivered by Prof. Luigi 
Zingales  of the University of Chicago Booth School of 
Business. The conference was organized by Tito 
Cordella and Tatiana Didier on behalf of the World 
Bank, and Enrique Alberola and Ignacio Hernando on 
behalf of the Banco de España.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SEMINARS 2014
LINK TO SEMINARS PAGE
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, COMPETITION AND PRODUCTIVITY
LILIANA VARELA
Paris School of Economics
15 JANUARY 2014
START-UPS, HOUSE PRICES, AND THE JOBLESS RECOVERY
IMMO SCHOTT 
European University Institute
16 JANUARY 2014
THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL LITERACY: THEORY 
AND EVIDENCE
ANNAMARIA LUSARDI
George Washington University
17 JANUARY 2014
WHY DID SPONSOR BANKS RESCUE THEIR SIVs?  
A REPUTATIONAL MODEL OF RESCUES
ANATOLI SEGURA
CEMFI
20 JANUARY 2014
DISTORTIONS IN THE NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL: A CROSS 
COUNTRY ANALYSIS
PEDRO BRINCA
Stockholm University
21 JANUARY 2014
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SYSTEMIC RISK AND MARKET LIQUIDITY
KEBIN MA
Warwick University
14 APRIL 2014
ANCHORING THE YIELD CURVE USING SURVEY EXPECTATIONS
RAFFAELLA GIACOMINI
University College London
13 MAY 2014
POST-RECESSION US EMPLOYMENT THROUGH THE LENS  
OF A NON-LINEAR OKUN’S LAW
LAURENT FERRARA
Banque de France
22 MAY 2014
ENDOGENOUS FIRMS DYNAMICS AND BANKING
LORENZA ROSSI
Università di Pavia
11 JUNE 2014
FISCAL SPILLOVERS IN THE EURO AREA
GUGLIELMO MARIA CAPORALE
Brunel University London
18 JUNE 2014
NYFED SURVEY OF CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS: AN OVERVIEW, 
AND INVESTIGATION OF EXPECTATIONS FORMATION
BASIT ZAFAR
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
18 JUNE 2014
EDUCATE TO LEAD? THE EFFECT OF POLITICIANS’ EDUCATION 
ON PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION: EVIDENCE FROM JAVA
MÓNICA MARTÍNEZ-BRAVO
CEMFI
19 FEBRUARY 2014
REALLOCATION AND PRODUCTIVITY
ERIC BARTELSMAN
VU University Amsterdam
5 MARCH 2014
HETEROGENEITY AND GOVERNMENT REVENUES: HIGHER TAXES 
AT THE TOP?
NEZIH GUNER
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
12 MARCH 2014
WHAT EXPLAINS JAPAN’S PERSISTENT DEFLATION?
ANDREA FERRERO
University of Oxford
19 MARCH 2014
A THEORY OF VINTAGE CAPITAL INVESTMENT  
AND ENERGY USE
LUIS A. PUCH
Universidad Complutense
26 MARCH 2014
UN SISTEMA DE CUENTAS PÚBLICAS TERRITORIALIZADAS  
PARA ESPAÑA
ÁNGEL DE LA FUENTE
IAE-CSIC
2 APRIL 2014
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PROFILES 
GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ ZAMBRANO
Unit Head, Banking Analysis Unit
Banking Analysis and Regulatory Policy Division
Financial Stability Department
DG Banking Regulation and Financial Stability
PEOPLE
Gabriel Jiménez Zimbrano heads the Banking Analysis 
Unit in the Financial Stability Department of the Banco 
de España. His team has performed extensive 
analyses of microdata from the Spanish banking 
system, to monitor the impact of monetary and bank 
regulatory policy on the Spanish economy.
RU: Recently you and your coauthors have 
published several very prominent empirical 
papers. Tell us about them.
Yes, our papers on the credit channel of monetary 
policy came out in American Economic Review in 
2012, and in Econometrica this year. We have been 
publishing in finance and  banking journals for many 
years, but it was a pleasant surprise to get accepted 
in those top general interest journals. The fact is you 
try to do as well as you can, but at the end of the 
day it is a mystery what impact a research paper will 
have until you send it off for publication. 
The two papers are actually closely related – we 
started them in parallel around seven years ago...
RU: The main difference is that one paper studied 
how monetary policy affects the quantity of credit, 
while the other looked at its impact on the quality 
of credit. Is that right?
Yes. Specifically, both papers looked at the bank 
balance-sheet channel of monetary policy 
transmission. Theory suggests that changes in 
monetary policy can affect the credit supplied by 
banks, especially in the case of weaker banks. Many 
previous studies have offered some empirical support 
for the theory, but our AER paper was able to 
distinguish between the effects of credit supply and 
credit demand in an especially clear way. That is 
difficult, because an increase in the policy rate affects 
both the supply and demand sides, raising the cost of 
funds both for lenders and for borrowers simultaneously.
RU: Your results supported the theory, no?
Yes. The first paper showed that adverse 
macroeconomic conditions, like a fall in output or a 
monetary tightening, can lead to a contraction of 
credit if the banking system is short of capital. The 
second paper tested a more recent extension of the 
theory, the so-called “risk-taking channel” of 
monetary policy. That theory suggests that when 
the policy rate is low, banks are likely to search for 
yield by taking more risks, relaxing their lending 
criteria and granting loans to weaker borrowers. 
And indeed, we found evidence that low short term 
interest rates induce less-capitalized banks to 
extend more loans to riskier firms. We also found 
that those loans were larger and required less 
guarantees, all of which made them more vulnerable 
to subsequent defaults.
RU: Concretely, which years were you looking at? 
We were looking at the pre-crisis period – from 2002 
to 2008.
Again, the main challenge we faced was separating 
out the effects of monetary policy on the overall 
supply of credit from those on the composition of 
credit supply and from changes in the composition 
of demand. Our strategy was similar to that from the 
AER paper, but improved, controlling not only for 
the quantity of demand, but also for selection bias. 
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So in addition to the extensive margin – meaning 
the probability of conceding a loan – we also looked 
at the intensive margin – meaning the quantity lent, 
as well as the conditions of the loan. So we were 
looking at a lot of effects simultaneously.
RU: So, could you explain, in a non-technical way, 
how you controlled for demand?
The idea is actually quite simple. First of all, what is 
necessary is adequate data. The crucial thing is that 
we not only have information on individual loans, 
but we also have a database of individual loan 
applications. In and of itself that is already a way of 
controlling for demand, because you are literally 
observing the demand for loans that is coming to 
the banks. But in addition, the data show that 
usually when firms are looking for a loan, they apply 
at various banks simultaneously. Or when they are 
looking for multiple loans, they apply to more than 
one bank. This gave us a clean and straightforward 
way to control for all observable and unobservable 
characteristics of each firm: we simply included 
fixed effects for each firm, at each time, in our 
estimation. That allowed us to control for variation 
in loan demand, so any remaining variation in 
lending could be interpreted as changes in loan 
supply. Without a database of loan requests we 
would not have been able to pursue that strategy.
RU: So obviously that is a really exceptional 
database. You not only have data on loans granted 
in Spain, but also data on loan applications by 
specific firms to specific banks.
Our main source of information is the Central de 
Información de Riesgos (CIR) database maintained 
by the Banco de España, which contains detailed 
information on all bank loans of €6000 or more 
granted in Spain. It includes loans to firms and to 
individuals, but we have focused our study on firms. 
The data include the type of operation, the quantity, 
the maturity of the loan, the collateral, defaults, and 
importantly, we know which bank made the loan and 
we have a code that identifies the borrower. Since we 
know the bank, we can control for its balance sheet 
and other characteristics using Banco de España 
supervisory data. Using the code that identifies the 
firms, we can also cross-reference our CIR data with 
other economic and financial data on Spanish firms. 
But as I was saying, while we were writing these 
papers we discovered another data source that had 
not yet been explored, with information on loan 
applications. Spanish banks are required to report 
information on their loans to the CIR; in exchange, 
the Banco de España provides them with information 
on aggregate credit of current borrowers but also on 
potential borrowers. That is, when a firm comes into 
a bank to a request a loan, the bank can automatically 
obtain information from the Banco de España on that 
firm’s total outstanding debt to the Spanish banking 
system. So those data requests indicate to the Banco 
de España that a loan application is underway. Then 
we can then keep track of new loans in the CIR to 
check whether that loan was granted or not. 
RU: But, in principle, a bank could receive an 
application, without requesting information about 
the borrower? 
Yes, it’s possible. No dataset is perfect. But that seems 
unlikely, because it is quick and costless for the bank 
to request that information electronically. So it’s logical 
to assume that most loan applications entailed a data 
request to the Banco de España, especially for new 
borrowers. So we assembled the database from the 
records of loan requests, which was a substantial 
improvement over the data we had before.
RU: Are there any other institutions or countries 
that have data of this sort?
Before our work, no. In some countries there were 
studies of loan applications at individual banks. But 
no one had assembled a database on loan 
applications, over multiple years, throughout the 
whole banking system. Since we circulated our 
papers, a number of other central banks, including 
the Bank of Italy, have begun to create similar 
datasets.
RU: Obviously these data are extremely confidential. 
How does the Banco de España protect them?
The Banco de España does not release these data 
to outside researchers. When we work with 
economists from other institutions, we always make 
clear that we will analyze the data ourselves. 
Outside economists can propose research projects 
to us, which we evaluate. But, consistent with the 
data protection law, they can never have the data 
on their computers. The statistical analysis is always 
performed at the Banco de España, on our own 
computers, by Banco de España staff. The data 
have never been released to third parties.
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RU: Considering your results, should the Banco 
de España have done anything differently during 
the boom years, to avoid the crisis that followed?
Of course, with hindsight things could have been 
done differently in Spain and elsewhere. But 
everything is clearer with hindsight. In fact, the 
Banco de España was a pioneer in macroprudential 
policy. Already in 2000 it introduced its system of 
dynamic provisioning, in order to build up a stock of 
provisions to offset the impact of any future credit 
crisis. That was more than ten years before the Basel 
negotiations began to consider countercyclical 
capital buffers. And indeed, in a paper that we 
currently have under revision at the Journal of 
Political Economy, we show that the institutions that 
built up a larger buffer prior to the crisis subsequently 
cut credit less than the others. So that mechanism 
was a step in the right direction. That same paper 
finds further results with clear policy implications. 
We find that raising capital requirements after a 
crisis starts only serves to restrict credit further, and 
forces renegotiation of the lowest-quality loans. So 
while increasing capital in boom years is a good idea 
from a macroprudential point of view, tightening 
capital requirements in bad times is much more 
contractive for credit and real output.
RU: Seven years to publish a paper is a bit of an 
odyssey, no? What kind of hoops did you have to 
jump through?
Yes, if we had anticipated that it would take seven 
years maybe we would never have started – though 
if we had known the final result I suppose we would 
have forged ahead. But every researcher understands 
that you can devote years to a project without 
obtaining the result you hope for. Our second paper 
was rejected twice, and then it was under revision 
for three years at another top journal where it was 
nonetheless rejected. It changed a lot over that time, 
though we kept the title. We started with a duration 
model, where we showed that loans made initially at 
a low interest rate faced a greater risk of default 
when the rate subsequently rose. We were 
continually modifying the paper in response to 
referees’ suggestions, and we stayed optimistic 
because we felt that the results were increasingly 
solid and very meaningful from a policy point of 
view. We finally submitted it to Econometrica, where 
it evolved again over four years of revisions, but we 
are very pleased with how it turned out.
RU: In your current work you are studying how 
lack of credit is affecting employment in Spain. 
Could you tell us about that project?
Yes. What we are doing in our latest work is to 
compare how employment changed, during the first 
years of the crisis, depending on whether the 
employer was financed at the beginning of the crisis 
by a weaker bank or by a healthier bank. By weaker 
banks we simply mean those that were eventually 
rescued or acquired. We show, with a difference-in-
differences analysis, that employment fell far more 
at firms that were primarily financed in 2006 by one 
of those weaker banks, as compared with similar 
firms financed by one of the stronger banks.
RU: Of course, one might expect that if firms are 
denied credit at one bank, they would simply 
apply for a loan elsewhere.
Yes, so what we are finding indicates that it is not so 
easy to shift from a relationship with one bank to 
another, especially during a crisis. And therefore 
that preexisting relationship has an impact on firms’ 
survival and the employment they can sustain. And 
in fact we find that much of the loss of employment 
takes place in the most inefficient way possible, due 
to firm closure, which implies an even slower 
recovery than the job loss itself would imply.
RU: On a personal and professional level, here at 
the Banco de España some research staff come 
from academic backgrounds, but we also have 
researchers, like you, who picked up many of their 
skills from on-the-job experience. How did you gain 
the expertise to do the kind of research you do?
My undergraduate training was in mathematics, and 
then I got introduced to finance and econometrics at 
CEMFI. But yes, much of my training has been my 
day-to-day work at the Bank. And as you can see, my 
research has always been empirical. I have been 
looking at theoretical ideas that are central to exciting 
policy debates. The issue is then to be able to apply 
the most appropriate statistical techniques for each 
type of empirical question, and I’ve built up that kind 
of knowledge first at CEMFI, then over the course of 
my career at the Banco de España, as well as by 
collaboration with my coauthors, especially with José 
Luis Peydró.  I would also like to thank the colleagues 
at CEMFI who have always been willing to provide 
methodological advice when we needed it.
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RU: Could you tell us something about your 
current or future research plans?
We have lots of projects in mind, but one that is 
further along is looking at how the crisis has 
affected innovation at Spanish firms. It’s a very 
relevant question, which is related to the persistence 
of credit shocks over time. 
RESEARCH PAGE: 
http://www.bde.es/investigador/staff/62.htm
NEW FACES
PATRICIA GÓMEZ GONZÁLEZ
Staff economist
Economic Analysis and Forecasting Department
DG Economics, Statistics and Research
PATRICIA GÓMEZ GONZÁLEZ joined the Economic 
Analysis and Forecasting Department of the Banco 
de España in September 2014. Patricia obtained her 
Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology in June 2014. She also holds 
undergraduate degrees in Law and Economics from 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) and an M.Sc. in 
Economics from UPF-Barcelona Graduate School of 
Economics. During her graduate studies she obtained 
fellowships from the Banco de España, the Caja 
Madrid Foundation, and the La Caixa Foundation. 
Her research interests are focused on macro-
economics and international economics. In 
particular, she works on sovereign debt and its 
interactions with financial markets. Her latest 
research studies financial innovation in sovereign 
debt markets. In economies where public debt has 
a liquidity purpose for the productive domestic 
sector and is demanded by international investors, 
innovations can increase investment and welfare. 
The main result is that a government can achieve 
this by introducing public assets that lower the cost 
of liquidity hoarding for the productive domestic 
sector. This project also explores, using a dataset 
on public debt ownership, the relationship between 
the investor base composition of public debt and 
other key variables in the model. 
Patricia has also explored the connections between 
banking and sovereign debt crises, and has focused 
on bailouts as a transmission mechanism between 
the two. Finally, she has worked on the effects of 
terms of trade volatility shocks in small open 
economies. 
RESEARCH PAGE:  
http://www.bde.es/investigador/staff/121.htm
JUAN DE LUCIO
Staff economist
ADG International Affairs
JUAN DE LUCIO joined the ADG International Affairs in 
September 2014. He studied economics at 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, then received 
a Master’s degree in Industrial Organization from 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. He obtained his 
Ph.D. in Economics in 1997 from Universidad Alcalá 
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de Henares, where his dissertation was awarded the 
university’s extraordinary prize. He has been 
Professor of Economics at Universidad Alcalá de 
Henares and at the Instituto de Empresa (Madrid). 
Meanwhile, he also worked for five years at FEDEA 
and for sixteen years at the High Council of Spanish 
Chambers of Commerce, where he headed the 
economics and research department. He has also 
had various responsibilities at the National Statistical 
Institute, including acting as a member of the High 
Council of Statistics and as a member of the Advisory 
Committee for national statistical plans.
His research interests relate mainly to applied 
economics, with emphasis on the following areas: 
regional economics, international economics, 
business, political economy, and analysis of the 
economic outlook. 
JAIME MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN
Staff economist
ADG International Affairs
JAIME MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN returned to the Banco de 
España in July 2014, joining the International 
Economics Division. He obtained his B.A. in 
Economics from the Univ. of Barcelona, and he 
continued his studies in 2005 at the Catholic 
University of Leuven in Belgium, where he earned 
an MSc in international economics. During his 
doctoral work, he visited the Economics 
Department at the University of Southern California 
in 2009; subsequently he completed his Ph.D. with 
Honours at the Univ. of Barcelona in 2011. He has 
worked as a Senior Economist at BBVA Research 
for the past 5 years, and previously as an economist 
in the DG Economics, Statistics and Research at 
the Banco de España. 
His doctoral research analyzed the interaction of 
spatial linkages in Spanish capital outflows, the 
estimation of export and import demand functions 
under a macroeconometric model, and the dynamics 
of Spanish exports and FDI. His current work 
focuses on international macroeconomics and 
applied econometrics, with particular emphasis on 
global business cycles. Other research interests 
include international trade, economic modeling, and 
forecasting.  
VISITING FELLOWS
OURANIA DIMAKOU
Lecturer in Economics
SOAS
University of London
OURANIA DIMAKOU obtained her bachelor’s degree 
from Athens University of Economics and Business 
in 2001, and completed her Ph.D. in Economics at 
Birkbeck, University of London in 2010. She has 
worked as a Senior Teaching Fellow and is a 
Lecturer in Economics at the School of Oriental 
and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, 
since 2011. 
Ourania visited the ADG International Affairs from 
April until August 2014. Her latest research project 
focuses on formal and informal labor markets in 
Latin American countries. In particular, her research 
at the Banco de España investigates the impact of 
a goods market institutional reform (the SIMPLES 
program) on employment formalization in Brazil. 
Other research interests include monetary and fiscal 
institutional design and bureaucratic corruption. 
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EDDIE GERBA
LSE Research Fellow in Macroeconomics
London School of Economics
EDDIE GERBA is visiting the Bank of Spain from 
September 2014 to August 2015. During his time at 
the Bank, Eddie will work on incorporating 
endogenous risks and financial innovation in a 
financial friction model with asset price bubbles, in 
order to study the impact of risk and credit cycles 
on the business cycle. Time permitting, he will use 
this framework to examine the joint stabilizing role 
of monetary and macro-prudential policies, and to 
derive the optimal policy combination. Other 
projects Eddie is currently involved in include an 
examination of the impact of stock market bubbles 
on the supply side constraints of firms, an empirical 
study of the effects of US social security reforms on 
household finances and household leverage, and a 
(re)examination of the joint importance of cognitive 
skills and physical capital for macroeconomic 
growth and development.
Eddie holds an undergraduate degree in Quantitative 
Economics from Universitat Pompeu Fabra, an MSc 
in Quantitative Finance from the Swiss Finance 
Institute at ETH Zurich, and a Ph.D. in Economics 
from University of Kent. Between 2013 and 2014, he 
worked as a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the LSE. In 
April this year, he took a new post as an LSE 
Research Fellow in Macroeconomics and is working 
with Professor Paul de Grauwe on developing 
heterogeneous agent models where agents are 
boundedly rational. 
Eddie’s research interests lie in the areas of 
theoretical macroeconomics, quantitative finance, 
and macroeconomic policies. He has previously 
worked on projects such as asset price cycles in a 
DSGE model, optimal monetary policy, monetary 
transmission in the Eurozone since the 1970´s, 
monetary-fiscal interactions in a time-varying 
parameter VAR framework, and US macro-financial 
linkages. 
RESEARCH PAGE: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/staff/
academicStaff/gerba/home.aspx
ALFREDO IBÁÑEZ
Quantitative Analyst
Bankia (on leave)
ALFREDO IBÁÑEZ is visiting the ADG International 
Affairs from September 2014 to March 2015. Alfredo 
has an Engineering degree in Computation from the 
Universidad de Valladolid and a Ph.D. in Economics 
from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with 
specialization in Financial Economics. He has been 
an Associate Finance Professor at ITAM (Mexico 
City) for seven years, a visiting scholar at UCLA 
(California), and Visiting Professor at the Business 
Departments of Universidad Carlos III, UPF 
(Barcelona), and ESADE Business School 
(Barcelona). He also spent four years working in the 
financial industry, developing and implementing 
option-pricing models for equity and fixed-income 
derivatives at CajaMadrid/Bankia (Madrid).
His main area of research is financial economics – 
from American option pricing, hedging, risk 
management, and volatility, to term-structure 
models and credit risk. Right now, he is involved in 
two main research projects: a) option pricing in high 
dimensional problems by Monte Carlo simulation, 
and b) default risk, viewed as the optimal exercise 
of an American-style option. 
RESEARCH PAGE: 
https://sites.google.com/site/alfreibanez
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CARLOS J. SERRANO
Assistant Professor
Department of Economics and Business
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Carlos J. Serrano is an Assistant Professor of 
Economics and Business at Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra in Barcelona and an Affiliated Professor at the 
Barcelona GSE, where he teaches business 
economics, economic institutions and markets, and 
technology strategy. He has also taught at the Univ. 
of Toronto (2005-2012) and the Univ. of Minnesota 
(2002-2004), and worked as a Research Analyst at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2002-
2005). Carlos received his doctoral degree from the 
Univ. of Minnesota in 2006, and has been a Faculty 
Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) since 2006, and a Research 
Associate at the Research Institute for International 
Business (RIIB) of the Univ. of Toronto since 2012.
Carlos’ research focuses on innovation and 
technological change, entrepreneurship, and 
entrepreneurial finance. While at the Banco de 
España, from Oct. 2014 to June 2015, he plans to 
undertake two research projects. The first aims to 
document the role of patents as collateral. While 
some financial institutions accept patents as 
collateral for loans, they do not generally count 
towards regulatory capital requirements because 
they are too difficult to value. However, intangible 
assets, such as patents, account for a rising share 
of corporate value. This study aims to shed light on 
which technology sectors and what types of firms 
offer a lien on their patents, and when they do so 
over the business cycle, and to describe which 
types of lenders choose to hold them. This 
descriptive study points towards important policy-
related questions. How much would the financing 
opportunities for firms expand if banking regulation 
were more flexible towards valuing intangible 
assets? What firms and technology sectors would 
benefit the most from such policies?
The second project investigates the use of formal 
external debt to finance early-stage science and 
technology startups (i.e., ‘the market for venture 
lending’). It explores two potential mechanisms to 
facilitate trade in this market: increased liquidity in 
the secondary market for patents assets, which 
could alter lender expectations of salvage value, 
and the ability of an intermediary (here, the venture 
capitalist) to credibly convey to lenders that he/she 
will support the fledging company. If the 
development of an intermediary market for valuing 
and exchanging patents facilitates lending by 
increasing the collateral value of patent-based 
assets, it would make sense for regulators to 
examine mechanisms that would allow banks to 
count patent collateral towards regulatory capital 
requirements. If venture capitalist commitment is 
crucial for venture lending, policies designed to 
stimulate entrepreneurial-firm innovation through 
debt financing will be muted absent a well-
developed infrastructure of venture capitalists and 
institutional investors.
RESEARCH PAGE: 
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~cserrano
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JOB OPENINGS FOR PH.D. ECONOMISTS
The Banco de España, the Spanish central bank, is 
interested in hiring experienced or newly qualified 
Ph.D.s in economics or related fields for its headquarters 
in Madrid. The areas of interest include monetary 
policy, international economics and macro-finance, 
banking and finance, industrial organisation, and 
applied micro- and macroeconomics. The main tasks 
of the potential candidates would be to conduct high-
quality policy-oriented research, to produce reports for 
the Bank’s senior management and to write for the 
Bank’s publications. Applicants would be expected to 
travel and participate in meetings organised by 
international institutions. Permanent or fixed-term full-
time contracts could be offered. A sound command of 
written and spoken Spanish will be highly valued. The 
Banco de España provides an excellent working and 
research environment. Salary and benefits are 
competitive.
Applicants should e-mail a CV, a sample of recent 
research and at least three references to the Head of 
the Training and Recruitment Division by 25 November 
2014. The actual letters of reference may be posted by 
ordinary mail.
E-mail for information and applications: rho.investigacion-
becas@bde.es.
View our announcement at Job Openings for Economists.
View our announcement at Econ Job Market.
ANNOUNCEMENTS
RESEARCH JOB VACANCIES
LINK TO JOB OPENINGS PAGE
23RD CEPR EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM  
IN INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMICS (ESSIM)  
RODA DE BARÁ, TARRAGONA
TARRAGONA, 26-29 MAY, 2015
HOST: BANCO DE ESPAÑA
The 23rd CEPR European Summer Symposium in 
International Macroeconomics (ESSIM) will take place 
26-29 May 2015 at the Banco de España facilities in 
Tarragona, Spain. 
ESSIM is an annual meeting that brings together about 
75 economists from across Europe and key researchers 
from outside the region to focus on international 
economics and other areas of macroeconomics. It 
provides a unique opportunity for macroeconomists 
from different institutions and countries to discuss 
research, and for young researchers to meet and 
discuss their work with senior economists. The 
programme combines workshop sessions with time for 
collaboration and consultation; participants are asked 
to stay for the whole week (arriving the evening of 
Monday, 25 May, and leaving the morning of Saturday, 
30 May). 
Submissions to the conference must be received no 
later than January 5, 2015 via the CEPR Forthcoming 
Events Page. 
UPCOMING CONFERENCES
LINK TO CONFERENCES PAGE
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